We analyze the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium in a capital accumulation model where individual preferences are subject to both habit formation and consumption spillovers. Using an additive specification for preferences, according to which the argument in the utility function is a linear combination of present and past values of own consumption and consumption spillovers, we analyze the circumstances under which these spillovers are a source of inefficiency. It is shown that consumption externalities have to interact with habits in order to generate an inefficient dynamic equilibrium. Finally, we characterize optimal tax policies aimed at restoring efficient decentralized paths.
I. Introduction
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agents' consumption. Intertemporal general equilibrium models have traditionally assumed that individual tastes are exogenous in the sense that, in each period, agents derive utility exclusively from the absolute level of their own current consumption. We consider instead a model where tastes are endogenous, since the utility derived from a given level of present consumption depends on a reference level, which can be viewed as a (time-varying) standard of living. More precisely, we assume that the argument in the agents' utility function is an additive combination of present and past values of individual consumption and consumption spillovers. It should be pointed out that a growing number of papers in macroeconomics have introduced endogenous preferences in order to account for some economic facts that cannot be reconciled with the more traditional theories based on exogenous preferences.
1 Even if these papers view consumption externalities as a relevant phenomenon, a comprehensive analysis of the circumstances under which these externalities give rise to inefficiency is missing in the literature. In this paper we perform such an analysis and show that the existence of inefficiency requires consumption externalities to interact with some form of habits.
The introduction of habit formation implies that the individuals of our model derive utility from the comparison of the current level of own consumption with that of the previous period. Therefore, when individuals choose their current consumption, they are simultaneously setting a standard of living that will be used to evaluate the utility accruing from the level of future consumption. We assume that past consumption imposes a minimum level for future consumption and, hence, we use an additive functional form to introduce habits. This is in contrast to the ''multiplicative'' specification considered by other authors such as Abel (1990) , Carroll et al. (1997 Carroll et al. ( , 2000 and Carroll (2000) . The reason for our choice is that the additive formulation allows us to maintain the usual concavity property of the utility function. Moreover, some empirical studies have also used the additive specification of habits to reconcile theory with consumption data; see, for instance, Ferson and Constantinides (1991) and Heaton (1995) .
We also assume that the benchmark level of consumption of an individual is affected by the level of consumption of his neighbors.
2 More precisely, our individuals' utility will depend on both the lagged and the current levels of average consumption in the economy. These consumption spillovers may either reduce or increase the felicity that each individual obtains from his own (habit-adjusted) consumption. Thus, the individuals of our model could exhibit either jealousy or altruism. Moreover, these consumption spillovers could either reduce or increase the private marginal utility of consumption. Therefore, our model encompasses both the ''catching up with the Joneses'' and the ''keeping up with the Joneses'' features introduced by Abel (1990) and Galí (1994) , respectively. In the former case the lagged value of others' consumption makes the marginal increase of current own consumption more valuable, while in the latter case the current value of others' consumption increases the private marginal utility. In order to be consistent with the functional form used to introduce habits, we also apply the additive specification for consumption spillovers. Therefore, the argument appearing in the individuals' utility function turns out to be an additive combination of the current level of own consumption, the lagged value of own consumption, the current level of average consumption and the lagged value of average consumption.
The rest of the model has the typical features of a deterministic economy with infinitely lived agents. The production side is modeled by means of a standard neoclassical production function exhibiting constant returns to scale. The equilibrium exhibits transitional dynamics driven by both the decreasing returns to capital and the time dependence of preferences. Note that consumption does not adjust instantaneously to its benchmark level, since the standard of living derived from past consumption is fixed in each period.
Consumption externalities constitute a potential source of equilibrium inefficiency as individuals do not take them into account when they choose their individual consumption paths. We will show that the competitive equilibrium is always efficient at the steady state, whereas it is dynamically inefficient under some conditions. In particular, our analysis will show that, under the additive specification of preferences, the key element for the existence of dynamic inefficiency is the interaction of consumption externalities with time dependent preferences. Thus, on the one hand, the externality associated with current average consumption does not generate inefficiency as long as individuals' preferences are not subject to either a process of habit formation or spillover effects from others' past consumption. Under timeindependent preferences, contemporaneous externalities do not have intertemporal effects on the marginal utility of own consumption and, thus, the functional form of the marginal rate of substitution of a competitive economy is identical to that of the social planner. In the presence of habits, contemporaneous consumption externalities affect the future standard of living and, thus, they have consequences for the individuals' willingness to substitute consumption across periods. Since a benevolent social planner would internalize these consumption spillovers, the marginal rate of substitution between consumption, at different periods, of an individual who behaves competitively differs from that of the social planner.
3 On the other hand, the externality associated with past average consumption generates inefficiency even in the absence of habit formation. These consumption spillovers already generate the required time dependency of preferences by themselves as they affect the future standard of living.
The existence of inefficient competitive paths calls for a tax policy aimed at replicating the socially planned solution. We characterize the optimal rates of both a capital income tax and a consumption tax. We show that, if individuals' willingness to shift present consumption to the future is suboptimally low along the socially planned solution, equilibrium efficiency will be achieved by means of either subsidizing capital income or introducing a tax on consumption with a tax rate falling over time. These tax policies decrease the relative price of future consumption and encourage individuals to shift consumption from the present to the future. Moreover, the optimal rates of the capital income tax and of the consumption tax converge to zero and to a constant value, respectively, since no inefficiencies appear at a steady state.
The outline of the paper is as follows. Section II introduces the benchmark model where preferences are determined endogenously. In Section III we derive the equilibrium path of the competitive economy, while in Section IV we characterize the solution of the socially planned economy. Section V addresses the efficiency properties of the competitive equilibrium. We characterize the optimal taxation policy in Section VI. Section VII concludes.
II. The Model
The economy is composed of a continuum of identical individuals who face an infinite lifetime in discrete time. The population grows at a constant exogenous growth rate n > À1. We assume that individuals derive utility from the comparison between current own consumption and a reference level. This reference level is determined by the lagged value of individuals' own consumption and by the current and the lagged average values of consumption in the economy. We thus posit the following instantaneous utility function:
where c t is the consumption of the individual under consideration in period t and c c t is the average consumption of the economy in period t. We assume that the preference parameters satisfy > 0, 2 (0,1) and < 1. The parameter becomes the inverse of the elasticity of intertemporal substitution when ¼ ¼ ¼ 0. The particular case with > 0 and ¼ ¼ 0 corresponds to the typical habit formation model where the amount of own consumption in the previous period becomes a standard of living that is used to evaluate the utility of current consumption. The parameter thus measures the importance of the reference set by past own consumption. We assume that > 0 for consistentency with the notion of habits. Thus, current utility is decreasing in past consumption for a given amount of present consumption. Moreover, the condition < 1 is imposed to guarantee that the discounted sum of utilities increases with the consumption level in any arbitrarily given period. As in Constantinides (1990) and Campbell and Cochrane (1999) , among others, we use an additive specification for modeling habit formation instead of the multiplicative one suggested by other such as Abel (1990 Abel ( , 1999 and Carroll et al. (1997 Carroll et al. ( , 2000 . The latter formulation would force us to consider only the case where the parameter takes a value larger than one in order to obtain interior solutions for the competitive consumption path. 4 Our specification of habit formation avoids this problem at the cost of potentially having negative habit-adjusted consumption and, hence, the utility function would not be well-defined in this case; see Carroll (2000) . In our deterministic framework, this problem is easily solved by imposing the appropriate parametric conditions that ensure a positive value for habits adjusted consumption.
Individual preferences also exhibit consumption externalities that affect both the individual's utility level and the marginal utility of individual consumption. On the one hand, if 6 ¼ 0, then individuals' utility is affected by an externality arising from the current average consumption in the economy. When > 0, individuals turn out to be jealous, since aggregate consumption reduces the individual's utility for a given level of own consumption. Moreover, since others' consumption in this case increases the marginal utility of own consumption, individual preferences exhibit the ''keeping up with the Joneses'' feature discussed in Galí (1994) . If < 0, then individuals turn out to be altruistic, since utility is increasing in aggregate consumption. Here, others' consumption makes an additional unit of own consumption less valuable. The restriction < 1 will be needed in order to obtain an objective function that is increasing in current consumption and concave for the social planner's problem. On the other hand, if 6 ¼ 0, then individuals care about the lagged value of average consumption in the economy. In particular, when we assume > 0 in (1), an individual feels jealous if others' past consumption increases and preferences then exhibit the ''catching up with the Joneses'' feature introduced by Abel (1990) . 5 The case < 0 obviously means that a rise in others' past consumption results in an increase in current felicity.
Note that, in order to be consistent with the specification used for the process of habit formation, we posit the additive formulation to introduce consumption spillovers. As pointed out above, we have to impose conditions that ensure a positive value of the argument of the utility function (1) along the equilibrium path of consumption. By simply imposing that þ þ < 1, we can guarantee that the utility function will be well-defined around a stationary consumption path. From now on, we assume that the previous inequality holds.
Each individual inelastically supplies one unit of labor in each period. A single good is produced in each period by means of a constant-returns-toscale technology, which uses labor and capital as inputs. Gross output per capita y t is thus a function of capital per capita k t ,
where the per capita production function f satisfies the standard neoclassical properties, f 0 (k t ) > 0 and f 00 (k t ) < 0, for k t > 0, and the usual Inada conditions. The single good of the economy can be either consumed or invested.
The government in this economy sets flat rate taxes on capital income and on consumption. We allow both tax rates to be time-varying. The fiscal revenues are returned to individuals by means of a lump-sum subsidy. Hence, the budget constraint of the government is as follows:
where k t and c t are, respectively, the capital income tax rate and the consumption tax rate at time t, r t is the rental rate of capital, and S t is a lump-sum transfer per capita. The budget constraint faced by an individual is thus
where w t is the rental rate of labor and 2 [0,1] is the depreciation rate of the capital stock.
In the next two sections we analyze the competitive equilibrium and the socially planned solution of this economy.
III. The Competitive Equilibrium
In the competitive economy, factor prices are equated to marginal productivities so that
and
Each individual chooses a sequence of consumption c t f g 1 t¼0 in order to maximize
subject to the budget constraint (3), for a given sequence c t f g 1 t¼À1 of average consumption and for the given initial conditions on capital k 0 and on consumption c À1 . The parameter 2 (0,1) is the subjective discount factor. In order to simplify the exposition, let us define uðtÞ uðc t ; c tÀ1 ; c t ; c tÀ1 Þ, u 1 ðtÞ @uðc t ; c tÀ1 ; c t ; c tÀ1 Þ=@c t and u 2 ðtÞ @uðc t ; c tÀ1 ; c t ; c tÀ1 Þ=@c tÀ1 . Moreover, according to (1), and using the fact that in a symmetric equilibrium c t ¼ c t for all t, we observe that in equilibrium,
and u 2 ðtÞ ¼ Àu 1 ðtÞ:
The first-order conditions of the previous problem are thus 
for all t, where l t denotes the shadow price of capital in period t. The competitive equilibrium is defined by the positive paths of c t , k t and l t satisfying conditions (8) and (9), the budget constraint (3), the budget constraint of the government (2), the profit-maximizing conditions (4) and (5), the transversality conditions
and the initial conditions on k 0 and c À1 . Note that past consumption is a state variable when preferences are subjected to habit formation. In this case, the solution to the optimization problem requires an additional transversality condition besides the typical condition involving the capital stock. Combining equations (8) and (9), and plugging (5) into the resulting equation, we obtain
which is the Euler condition equating the marginal rate of substitution (henceforth MRS) of consumption between periods t and t þ 1 with the corresponding marginal rate of transformation (henceforth MRT). Note equation (12) differs from the Euler equation appearing in standard models of capital accumulation because, here, consumers take into account the effect of current consumption when setting the reference for next-period consumption. Let us define the gross rate of growth of consumption,
and the gross rate of growth of the marginal utility u 1 (t),
Substituting (7) and (14) into (12), we obtain
Next, we combine the functional form (1) with the definition of the variable t given in (14), and then substitute the resulting expression in (13). Thus, we get
Combining the government and the individual budget constraints (2) and (3), and substituting (4) and (5) in the resulting equation, we obtain the resource constraint
The system of first-order difference equations (13), (15), (16) and (17), together with the transversality conditions (10) and (11), and the initial conditions on k 0 and c À1 , fully characterize the equilibrium path of the variables x t , t , c t and k t .
Let us now assume that the government follows a stationary tax policy, that is, c t ¼ c and
At a steady state of the system of dynamic equations (13), (15), (16) and (17), the variables x t , t , c t and k t are all constant. We suppress the time sub-indices to denote the stationary values of the variables under consideration. The following proposition characterizes the stationary equilibrium of the model:
) and c > À 1. An interior stationary equilibrium exists if and only if the following condition holds:
Moreover, this equilibrium satisfies 
Proof: See the Appendix.&
The parametric restrictions that appear in the preceding proposition are assumed to hold throughout the rest of the paper. To provide an analytical characterization of the stability properties of the steady state of the previous four-dimensional dynamic system turns out to be an infeasible task. However, we have analyzed these properties by performing systematic numerical simulations of the dynamic system formed by equations (13), (15), (16), and (17). In particular, we consider a benchmark example with a Cobb-Douglas production function of the form y t ¼ Ak ! t , and the following parameter configuration:
The values of A, !, n, , and were chosen according to a standard calibration procedure; see Cooley and Prescott (1995) . Since there is no conclusive evidence on the values of the preference parameters , and , we use a grid of values within the largest range found in the literature. On the one hand, the empirical literature on habits reports values of that go from zero to 0.7 depending on the goods and services under consideration; see Dynan, (2000) ; and Carrasco, Labeaga and López, (2002) . On the other hand, we fix ¼ and then use values of these two parameters so that the steady-state surplus of present consumption relative to the consumption reference, 1 À À À , lies on the interval [0.05,1]; see Campbell and Cochrane (1999) . In all our simulations we have found that the steady state exhibits saddle-path stability, i.e., two of the eigenvalues of the dynamic system have moduli smaller than one. We conjecture that this stability result holds for the whole set of feasible parameter values. From now on, we then assume that the steady state of our model is saddle-path stable so that, for given initial conditions on k 0 and c À1 , the equilibrium path converges to the steady state characterized above.
Next, we can characterize the long-run effects of changes in the stationary tax rates c and k . These effects immediately follow from performing a comparative static analysis over the expressions of c and k in (20) and (21). We observe that k is decreasing in k . Moreover, a change in the stationary tax rate c has no long-run effects. These results coincide with those obtained in the standard neoclassical growth model; see Hall (1971) and Brock and Turnovsky (1981) among many others. In fact, the steady state derived in this model with endogenous tastes coincides with the steady state of the standard neoclassical model. This occurs because the steady state is independent of the preference parameters , and .
IV. The Efficient Solution
We now turn our attention to the solution that a social planner would implement. This solution is also called the efficient solution. The planner internalizes the consumption spillovers and, thus, perceives the following instantaneous utility function: u uðc t ; c tÀ1 Þ uðc t ; c tÀ1 ; c t ;
Moreover, the aggregate resource constraint per capita faced by the social planner is exactly equation (17). Defineû uðtÞ û uðc t ; c tÀ1 Þ,û u 1 ðtÞ @û uðc t ; c tÀ1 Þ=@c t and u u 2 ðtÞ @û uðc t ; c tÀ1 Þ=@c tÀ1 . According to (22), we observe that
Our parametric restrictions < 1 and þ þ < 1 ensure that the function uˆwill be well-defined, increasing in current consumption, and concave (see (23)). Letl l t , cˆt andk k t denote the efficient shadow price of capital, the efficient amount of consumption and the efficient amount of capital, respectively. Then, the socially planned equilibrium is defined by the positive paths of cˆt,k k t andl l t , satisfying the condition
in addition to the resource constraint (17) expressed in terms of the efficient values of capital and consumption, the transversality conditions
and the initial conditions onk k 0 and cˆÀ 1 . Consumption externalities, habit formation and equilibrium efficiency 241
Let us define the gross rate of growth of the planner's marginal utility uˆ1(t),
Then, we can replicate the analysis performed when solving for the competitive solution in order to obtain the following system of first-order difference equations, which fully characterize the socially planned solution:
together with the transversality conditions (26) and (27) and the initial conditions onk k 0 and cˆÀ 1 . We can easily check that the difference equations (28), (30) and (31), which characterize the socially planned solution, are the exact counterparts of equations (13), (16) and (17), which characterize the competitive equilibrium. Therefore, the competitive and the socially planned solutions differ only in the equations that drive the evolution of t and t (see (15) and (29)). Proof: Obvious from evaluating equations (28)- (31) at t ¼ ,x x t ¼x x, cˆt ¼ câ ndk k t ¼k k for all t. By looking at equations (19)- (21), we can check that
Finally, using the arguments in the proof of Proposition 1, we can prove immediately thatl l t > 0 and that the transversality conditions (26) and (27) hold at the steady state. &
The preceding proposition tells us that, when the tax rate on capital income is zero and the tax rate on consumption is constant, the steady state of the competitive solution coincides with that of the efficient solution. Following a numerical analysis equivalent to that performed for the competitive equilibrium, it can be shown that the steady state of the socially planned solution is saddle-path stable under the same parameter configurations.
V. Equilibrium Efficiency
The competitive equilibrium could be inefficient in our model because individuals do not take into account the spillover effects arising from consumption. In fact, there are two potential sources of inefficiency: the externality associated with the lagged value of average consumption and that generated by the current level of average consumption. These externalities make individuals choose the current level of consumption without completely internalizing the effects on present and future marginal utilities. We now study the conditions under which a non-efficient path emerges in equilibrium.
Comparing the equations characterizing the competitive equilibrium with those characterizing the social planner's solution, we observe that the only difference is in the Euler equations (see (12) and (25)). More precisely, since the MRT of the competitive economy without taxes and that of the socially planned economy are identical, the competitive path of consumption c t f g 1 t¼0
would be efficient if and only if the functional forms of the MRSs of these two economies are also identical:
Therefore, the competitive equilibrium is efficient if and only if
for all t and for some constant along the competitive equilibrium path of consumption. Note that the efficiency condition (32) was obtained by abstracting from a specific functional form of the utility function. Therefore, the condition (32) can readily be used for alternative formulations of preferences, subject to habits and consumptions spillovers, in order to evaluate the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium. It should be pointed out that the efficiency condition (32) also applies when capital income is not taxed and the tax rate on consumption is constant, c t ¼ c tþ1 for all t, as follows from the Euler condition (12).
As regards the additive specification of the utility function considered in this paper, recall that u 2 (t) ¼ À u 1 (t) and uˆ2(t) ¼ À uˆ1(t)( þ )/(1 À ). Hence, using these properties of the utility function (1) and the definition of t the efficiency condition (32) becomeŝ
Given that externalities enter into the utility function in an additive way, u 1 (t) and uˆ1(t) are linearly dependent for all t. In particular, according to (6) and (23), it holds that uˆ1(t) ¼ (1 À )u 1 (t) along the competitive equilibrium path of consumption. Therefore, the efficiency condition (33) simplifies to
Let us emphasize two important conclusions from the efficiency condition (34). First, since the growth rate t of the marginal utility is not constant off the steady state of the competitive economy, the efficiency condition (34) does not hold along the transition to the steady state. Second, the externality associated with present average consumption does not generate inefficiency unless individuals' preferences are time-dependent. The following proposition states the result precisely: Proof: (a) Since the variable t is constant at the steady state, the statement in part (a) follows directly from condition (34). (b) First, when ¼ ¼ 0, there are no externalities and, hence, no source of inefficiency is present. Second, when ¼ ¼ ¼ 0, the efficiency condition (33) simplifies to uˆ1(t) ¼ u 1 (t), which is satisfied as follows from (6) and (23). & Under saddle-path stability, the statement in part (a) of the preceding proposition implies that the competitive equilibrium converges to an efficient stationary path. In fact, this property was already obtained in Section IV, where we saw that the stationary competitive solution with no taxes is identical to the stationary efficient solution. Part (b) of Proposition 3 tells us that inefficiency of the competitive equilibrium requires some consumption externality combined with time-dependent preferences. Since the externality arising from past average consumption generates this time dependency of preferences, the existence of only this externality is sufficient for inefficiency. However, the externality arising from current average consumption requires the presence of habits in order to make the equilibrium inefficient. Note that the situation with no habits ( ¼ ¼ 0) has already been analyzed by Fisher and Hof (2000) . In this case, efficiency just requires that the private and social marginal utilities be linearly proportional.
Assume first that there is no externality arising from past average consumption ( ¼ 0). If preferences are time-independent ( ¼ 0), the contemporaneous spillovers do not affect the unique margin of the individuals' decision problem, i.e., the intertemporal choice of consumption. Since own consumption and average consumption are perfect substitutes, the marginal utility corresponding to the socially planned economy is linearly proportional to that of the competitive economy, so that the MRS of both economies coincides. In contrast, if the contemporaneous externality coexists with a process of internal habit formation ( 6 ¼ 0 and 6 ¼ 0), then the externality also affects the standard of the living of the next period and, thus, it distorts the intertemporal choice of consumption. In the presence of habits, current consumption has two countervailing effects on the individuals' objective: it increases current utility and simultaneously reduces future utility as a consequence of the increase in the future standard of living. Hence, since the marginal utility of present consumption in the socially planned economy differs from the corresponding one in the competitive economy, the overall effect of present consumption is also different in the two economies. The willingness of individuals to experience changes in consumption along the equilibrium path is then non-optimal. Therefore, the MRS of the competitive economy differs from that of the socially planned economy.
Assume now that there is no externality associated with present average consumption ( ¼ 0). If spillovers arise from the lagged value of average consumption ( 6 ¼ 0), current consumption now affects the future standard of living in a way that individuals do not fully internalize. Therefore, the MRS of the competitive economy would also differ from that of the socially planned economy. Contrary to the previous case, the marginal utility of present consumption is now identical in both economies. However, the individuals' and the social planner's perceptions of the effect of present average consumption on future utility are now different.
VI. Optimal Taxation
We have just shown that the competitive equilibrium can be inefficient along the transition to the steady state. Inefficiency arises from the discrepancy between the functional form of the before-tax MRS of the competitive economy and the corresponding one of the socially planned economy (see (12) and (25)). The government can thus design a tax policy that restores the efficiency of the competitive equilibrium by driving the after-tax competitive MRS to its efficient value. We will see next that the consumption tax and the capital income tax are alternative instruments that allow the decentralized economy to reach an efficient equilibrium path.
Evaluating the Euler condition (12) corresponding to the competitive economy along the efficient path, and dividing the resulting equation by the Euler condition (25) of the socially planned economy, we obtain the following optimal taxation condition: competitive economy along an efficient path is smaller than that of the sociallyProof: Parts (a) and (b) of the proposition follow directly from (36) and (37), respectively, since < 1, þ þ < 1 and ¼ 1 at a steady state.& Observe that the parameter measures the distortion generated by the externality arising from past average consumption. Similarly, since the externality arising from current average consumption requires habits in order to generate inefficiency, measures the distortion which comes from the spillovers associated with current average consumption. Hence, þ determines the sign of the net distortion generated by consumption spillovers. This explains the role of the sign of þ in determining the dynamic behavior of optimal tax rates.
Let us also mention that, although the optimal tax rate on consumption characterized in Propositions 4 and 5 is time varying around the steady state, it converges to a constant value in order to allow for an efficient steady state in the long run. Similarly, the optimal tax rate on capital income should converge to zero.
Since our model contains two state variables,k k t and cˆt À1 , the transition of t depends on the particular initial values of these two variables. Hence, this transition could be non-monotonic. This implies that the optimal tax rates could also exhibit non-monotonic behavior along the transition.
7 More precisely, the optimal tax on capital income could be positive during some periods and become negative later on, or vice versa. Similarly, the optimal consumption tax could grow during a number of periods and decrease afterwards. We can illustrate this point by using the benchmark numerical example given in Section III. Let us assume that the initial values of the state values are k 0 ¼ 0.99k and c À1 ¼ 0.95c. For this economy, the optimal tax rate on capital income takes positive values, for t 4 7, whereas it takes negative values for t > 7. Similarly, the optimal tax rate on consumption is increasing for t 4 7 and decreasing for t > 7 for any arbitrarily given initial tax rate c 0 . Let us make a final comment on an economic implication of the dynamic behavior of optimal taxes that we have just characterized. According to this model, two economies that start from the same initial capital stock will display different optimal tax rates if they do not share a common initial value c À1 of the standard of living. This follows from the fact that not only the position of the capital stock with respect to its stationary value, but also the deviation of average past consumption of the economy with respect to its steady state, determines the amount of consumption competitively chosen by the individuals.
VII. Conclusion
In this paper we have analyzed the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium of an economy with capital accumulation, where we have assumed that preferences vary over time due to the existence of a process of habit formation and of consumption spillovers. Individuals will not derive utility from their absolute level of consumption at a given period, but from the difference between consumption and a reference level. This reference consumption is determined by an additive combination of past own consumption, the lagged value of average consumption and current average consumption.
This departure from the more traditional formulations of preferences has consequences for the dynamic behavior of both consumption and capital. In particular, consumption externalities could be an obvious source of inefficiency. More precisely, under the additive specification of preferences that we have assumed in this paper, these externalities affect the welfare properties of the competitive equilibrium only if preferences are time-dependent. Hence, contemporaneous consumption spillovers do not generate any kind of suboptimality as long as individuals' utility is not subject to either a process of habit formation or consumption spillovers from the lagged value of average consumption. This occurs because, in this case, the functional form of the marginal rate of substitution between consumption in different periods is identical to the efficient marginal rate of substitution. Consumption spillovers only break down the previous equality between the two marginal rates of substitution through their effect on the future standard of living. Obviously, this discrepancy calls for some public intervention aimed at restoring efficiency. If consumption spillovers affect habits in such a way that individuals' willingness to shift consumption to the future along an efficient path is below (above) the efficient one, the government maximizes welfare by means of either subsidizing (taxing) capital or taxing consumption with tax rates falling (increasing) over time. Furthermore, the optimal rates of the capital income tax and of the consumption tax converge to zero and to a constant value, respectively.
